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Abstract  
One quarter of the agricultural area in the European Union is registered in agri-
environmental programs. Despite the prevalence of such programs and increasing 
demands for environmental quality in the European Union, ex-post assessments 
of program benefits are rare. This study uses a structural econometric model to 
evaluate the impacts of agri-environmental payments provided through the 
Finnish Agri-Environmental Program, whose primary goal is to reduce nutrient 
pollution from agricultural land. Drawing on a representative sample of 
individual grain farms, the research quantifies the effects of agri-environmental 
payments on farmers’ decisions on the use of agri-chemical inputs and on the 
allocation of land to grain production and set-aside (fallow) over the period 
1996–2005. The effects of program payments are ascertained based on 
exogenous variation in payment rates across regions and over time. We find that 
the agri-environmental payments have reduced fertilizer inputs but that this 
impact has been modest. In terms of land allocation, the impact has been 
counterproductive in that the payments have slightly increased the grain area and 
reduced set-aside. To quantify the impact of agri-environmental payments on 
nutrient loading – the environmental outcome of interest – we then combine the 
predicted land allocation and fertilizer use with environmental production 
functions. Overall, we estimate that the payments have reduced the damage costs 
associated with nutrient pollution from grain farming by 11 to 12 percent. 
Key words: agri-environmental programs, payments for ecosystem services, 
farm subsidies, structural models, panel data, policy evaluation, nutrient 
pollution, cost-benefit analysis 
JEL classification numbers: H23, Q18, Q28, Q53, Q58 
 
  
  
 
Tiivistelmä 
Neljännes Euroopan unionin maatalousmaasta kuuluu maatalouden ympäristö-
tuen piiriin. Vaikka ympäristötuki on laajassa käytössä ja maatalouden ympäris-
tövaikutukset kasvavan huomion kohteena, perusteelliset empiiriset tutkimukset 
maatalouden ympäristötukien toteutuneista vaikutuksista ovat harvassa. Tämä 
tutkimus tarkastelee Suomen maatalouden ympäristötukien vaikutuksia raken-
teellisen ekonometrisen mallin avulla. Tutkimus analysoi edustavaa otosta vilja-
tiloista ja määrittää ympäristötuen vaikutukset viljelijöiden tuotantopäätöksiin – 
lannoitteiden käyttöön sekä vilja- ja kesantoaloihin – vuosina 1996-2005. Ympä-
ristötuen vaikutusten määrittäminen perustuu alueelliseen ja ajalliseen vaihteluun 
tukitasoissa. Ympäristötuet ovat vähentäneet lannoitteiden käyttöä viljatiloilla 
mutta vaikutus on ollut vähäinen. Pellonkäytön suhteen tukien vaikutus on ollut 
ympäristön kannalta haitallinen: tuet ovat lisänneet vilja-alaa ja pienentäneet ke-
santoalaa. Tukien varsinaisia ympäristövaikutuksia arvioidaan yhdistämällä eko-
nometrisen mallin ennustamat lannoitusintensiteetti sekä vilja- ja kesantoalat 
ravinnehuuhtoumia ennustavaan malliin. Kaiken kaikkiaan ympäristötuet ovat 
vähentäneet ravinnekuormitusta viljatiloilta 11–12 prosenttia.   
Key words: maatalouden ympäristötuki, ekosysteemipalvelujen tuottaminen, 
maataloustuet, rakenteelliset mallit, paneeliaineistot, ravinnekuormitus, 
kustannus-hyöty -analyysi 
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1. Introduction 
The European Union’s (EU) Agri-environment Regulation 2078/92/EEC, 
introduced as part of the 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
mandated the member states to submit national agri-environmental programs. 
The programs are designed to encourage farmers to produce non-market benefits 
of agriculture and to reduce agriculturally produced pollution. While the policy 
changes reflect the increasing demands for environmental quality, other driving 
factors were the need to reduce EU agricultural overproduction and demands 
from the World Trade Organization for a reduction in trade-distorting measures 
(Hanley and Oglethorpe 1999, Buller, Wilson and Höll 2000, Baylis et al. 2011). 
The design of national programs was entrusted to the member states. By 1997, 
more than 130 different programs had been approved (Buller 2000). By 2002, 
25% of the agricultural area in the European Union (EU15) was registered in one 
or more agri-environmental programs (AEP) and the annual EU budget spending 
on AEPs was on the order of 2,000 billion euros (European Commission 2005). 
At the level of the individual farmer, participation in an AEP is voluntary. 
Incentives are provided through program payments, but the requirements for 
participating farms tend to be quite general in nature. Payments are largely 
conditioned on environmentally benign practices, such as farm-scale 
environmental planning and monitoring, maintaining biodiversity, and farmer 
training, rather than on measurable outcomes. Participating farms thus have 
considerable flexibility in choosing the actions by which they address the 
environmental impacts of agricultural production, and the administrative burden 
remains moderate. In contrast to prominent conservation programs in the United 
States (US), such as the Conservation Reserve Program, EU AEPs generally aim 
at supporting environmentally friendly production practices on working land 
rather than encouraging land retirement.   
Little is known about whether participation in AEPs actually improves farms’ 
environmental performance. While the evaluation of AEPs is mandatory for the 
member states, rigorous empirical studies on program impacts are rare.1 To our 
knowledge, Pufahl and Weiss (2009) and Chabé-Ferret and Subervie (2012) are 
the only econometric analyses that explicitly investigate the effects of AEPs on 
observed farm production decisions. 
                                              
1 There is a substantial ecological literature which investigates AEP impacts. While not an exhaustive list, 
examples of studies dealing with European programs include Ekholm et al. (2007), on  Finland; Marggraf 
(2003), on German states; and Primdahl et al. (2003), on nine EU member states and Switzerland. The 
ecological literature focuses on trends in environmental indicators or the effect that stated goals, in terms 
of changes in agricultural practices, would have on the environment. It has not attempted to disentangle 
the effects of AEPs from other factors affecting production decisions such as input and output prices and 
other agricultural support policies.  
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This limited knowledge of AEP impacts is a significant shortcoming for two 
reasons. First, where environmental policy is concerned, it is important that we 
be able to ascertain whether programs are actually fulfilling their promise as 
policy measures by reducing the environmental damage or enhancing the positive 
effects attributable to agriculture vis-à-vis no policy. Second, in terms of trade 
policy, we need further information on whether programs are actually 
compensating farmers for non-market production activities or just greenwashing 
production subsidies; this is an issue that has led to considerable disagreement 
between the EU and the US – and between these two trading powers and 
developing countries – in the now-stalled Doha Round of trade liberalization 
talks (Hanrahan and Schnepf 2007, Baylis et al. 2011). Closer to the beginning of 
the Doha Round, the OECD noted: “A key policy concern is to distinguish 
between agri-environmental measures that actually address market failures by 
internalizing environmental externalities or ensuring the provision of public 
goods associated with agriculture, from policies that appear to be merely labeled 
‘green’ and used as a means of disguised protection” (OECD 2003). 
To help shed light on these issues, the present paper analyzes Finland’s 
implementation of the EU agri-environmental mandate, the Finnish Agri-
Environmental Program (FAEP). The program is nationwide and the only AEP in 
Finland. Its main focus is on reducing nutrient loss from agricultural land and it 
is considered the primary solution to the country’s considerable problems with 
surface water pollution from agriculture. The FAEP is among the most extensive 
in the EU, encompassing 90% of all the country’s farms and 92% of its 
agricultural area (Aakkula et al. 2010).2 Finnish authorities refer to the high 
participation rate as a measure of the program’s effectiveness. However, 
participation rates relate to promised rather than realized changes in management 
practices; they may merely reflect payment rates that are attractive relative to the 
costs of meeting program requirements, and thus have a weak relation to actual 
improvements (see e.g. Hanley and Oglethorpe 1999). Although developed in the 
context of corporate environmental management and thus not directly applicable 
to mostly family-operated farm enterprises, the considerable literature on 
voluntary environmental programs certainly raises questions about whether 
loosely defined, voluntary AEPs are likely to have environmental benefits (see 
e.g. Koehler 2007 for a recent review and Darnall and Sides 2008 for a meta-
analysis). 
We investigate how crop producers have responded to the FAEP by analyzing a 
structural econometric model of production decisions, drawing on a 
representative sample of individual grain farms over the period 1996-2005. We 
                                              
2 Accounts of AEPs in several EU countries may be found in Whitby (1996) and Buller, Wilson and Höll 
(2000). The member states and regional authorities have significant liberty in designing specific AEPs. 
Some of the programs apply to a large area (often the total agricultural area of the country), which is the 
case in Finland. Others target either a specific zone or specific types of farming. Baylis et al. (2011) and 
Baylis et al. (2004) provide comparisons of EU and US AEPs.  
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estimate a normalized quadratic profit function and the corresponding input 
demands and land allocation, with output and input prices, total land and 
compensatory payments (agri-environmental and other subsidies) as explanatory 
variables. We use the variation in compensatory payment rates across regions and 
over time to identify the impact of payments on production decisions. We are 
particularly interested in identifying the impact of FAEP payments on the use of 
fertilizer inputs and the allocation of land to grain production and set-aside 
(grassland). These variables are key determinants of the surface water pollution 
from agriculture. To assess the impact of the FAEP payments on water pollution, 
we use the estimated input demand and land allocation functions to predict 
farms’ fertilizer use and land allocation under two scenarios: a “factual” case 
where program payments are set to their historical values and a counterfactual 
one where agri-environmental payments are set to zero. We then combine the 
predicted fertilizer intensity and land allocation with environmental production 
functions to predict nutrient loading. Comparison of the outcomes using the 
factual baseline and the counterfactual makes it possible to identify the effect of 
the agri-environmental payments. Finally, relying on a valuation study measuring 
the willingness to pay for reducing nutrient loads from Finland to the Baltic Sea 
(Kosenius 2010), we compute the monetary value of environmental benefits 
attributable to the FAEP in our sample and compare them to the costs represented 
by the agri-environmental payments. 
Pufahl and Weiss (2009) evaluate the effect of German AEPs on farms’ use of inputs, 
including land allocation and agrichemicals, and output produced. Their approach uses 
farm-level panel data and difference-in-difference propensity score matching. The 
analysis reveals that AEP participation increased both the area under cultivation and 
grassland, and decreased the use of agrichemicals. Chabé-Ferret and Subervie (2012), 
also applying difference-in-difference matching, estimate the additional and windfall 
effects of five agri-environmental schemes in France with farm-level data. They find 
that the schemes promoting crop diversity and cover crops have had limited success, 
whereas the schemes subsidizing grass buffer strips and organic farming may well be 
socially efficient.  
The present study augments the empirical literature on the impacts of EU AEPs on 
agricultural input use, a line of inquiry begun by Pufahl and Weiss (2009) and Chabé-
Ferret and Subervie (2012). The structural approach taken here is different from the 
treatment effect approach in those studies in that we explicitly model farms’ production 
decisions and link them with environmental production functions. The approach enables 
consistent predictions of production choices and environmental outcomes, which can 
serve to both evaluate the impact of present AEP payments and forecast the impacts of 
alternative policy interventions, such as taxes on polluting inputs. Of course, the choice 
of methodology is also dictated by the policy to be evaluated. We examine an AEP 
setting that is very different from the German and French systems analyzed by Pufahl 
and Weiss (2009) and Chabé-Ferret and Subervie (2012). Germany and France have 
numerous agri-environmental schemes and only a limited proportion of agricultural land 
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is managed under AEPs. In Finland participation in the single, nationwide AEP is 
almost universal. Thus, the treatment effect approach, which requires a “treatment 
group” of participants and a “comparison group” of non-participants, is not applicable. 
Accordingly, our research design employs the structural approach, in which functional 
form and support conditions substitute for the lack of a comparison group (see e.g. 
Heckman and Vytlacil 2007, Heckman 2010, Keane 2010). An advantage of explicitly 
modeling farms’ input demands and land allocation is that linking the estimated model 
with environmental production functions lends itself to quite precise benefit-cost 
analysis: one can predict the impact of program payments on measurable environmental 
outcomes – reductions in nutrient loads – with direct counterparts in valuation studies.  
The section to follow begins with a description of the FAEP. We then present the 
microeconomic behavioral model, which comprises farms’ decisions on land allocation 
and agrichemical use, and our estimation methodology. This is followed by a 
presentation of the data and the estimation results for the behavioral model and 
simulation of the “factual” and counterfactual policy scenarios. We then proceed with a 
description of the environmental production functions and the monetary benefits of 
reduced nutrient pollution, and assess the benefits and costs of the FAEP payments for 
the farms in our sample. The last section summarizes and discusses the results and 
proposes some directions for further research. 
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2. Background 
Water pollution caused by agriculture, in particular nutrient enrichment of 
surface waters, is viewed as a major environmental problem in Finland. The 
adjacent Baltic Sea suffers from severe nutrient-related degradation of water 
quality, with intensive agriculture the largest source of nutrients (e.g. Helcom 
2010). Since Finland’s geography is characterized by numerous lakes, 
agricultural chemicals are easily transported into aquatic environments: drainage 
waters from some 90% of the country’s agricultural land flow into lakes or 
rivers, and a large proportion of the nutrients originating from agricultural land 
eventually enter the Baltic Sea (Puustinen et al. 1994, Lepistö et al. 2006). 
Launched upon Finland’s accession to the EU in 1995, the FAEP emphasizes 
pollution control, although it also includes measures targeting biodiversity and 
landscape protection. The first two program periods (1995-1999 and 2000-2006) 
sought a 30-40% reduction in the nutrient loads from agricultural land relative to 
the loads in the early 1990s (MAF 2000). However, monitoring data do not 
indicate a significant reduction in nutrient loading or improvement in water 
quality (Ekholm et al. 2007).   
The FAEP provides payments to support environmentally beneficial farming 
practices on all, not just environmentally sensitive, land. The program is divided 
into general and special sub-programs. Farms participating in the general sub-
program sign renewable five-year contracts in which they agree to follow a set of 
mandatory environmental protection measures, identical across farms within a 
production line. For grain production, the major form of crop production in 
Finland, the mandatory measures impose limits on fertilizer use and require 
construction of field margins and vegetative filter strips along waterways. In 
southern Finland, farms are also required to choose one additional measure, such 
as stricter constraints on fertilizer use, promotion of biodiversity, or maintenance 
of wintertime vegetation on part of their arable area; the last of these was a 
mandatory measure in southern Finland in the first program period (1995-1999). 
In northern Finland, the additional measures are all optional. The general scheme 
also lists a number of mandatory, albeit loosely defined, environmentally 
beneficial practices.3 Farms participating in the general sub-program are 
compensated through an area-based payment. The overall general sub-program 
participation rate was 84% in 1995-1999 and 90% in 2000-2006 (MAF 2004). 
The special sub-program encourages the implementation of more specific 
environmental management measures, such as establishment and management of 
riparian zones or wetlands. Farms opting to join the special sub-program sign a 
five- to ten-year contract, for which participation in the general sub-program is a 
prerequisite. Financial support for most of the special sub-program measures is 
                                              
3 These include farmer training, farm environmental planning and monitoring, environmentally sound use 
of pesticides, maintenance of biodiversity, and landscape management. 
 6 
 
tailored to cover the investment and management costs as estimated by the farm, 
up to a support ceiling set by the EU. Other production aid available to grain 
farms includes CAP arable-area and less-favored-area payments and national aid 
for crop production. 
The agricultural support payment rates are graded over seven support regions, 
which were delineated at the time of Finland’s accession to the EU in 1995 and 
reflect regional climatic conditions. We focus on the four southernmost regions 
(labeled A to C2), which encompass Finland’s grain production area (see Figure 
1). The variation in compensatory payment rates across support regions and over 
time allows us to identify the impact of the subsidies on production decisions in 
the subsequent econometric analysis. Variation in the payment rates arises for 
several reasons: support for crop production is determined on the basis of 
historical reference yields; general agri-environmental support is calculated based 
on the regional average costs of implementing the required changes in farming 
practices; southern Finland was initially not eligible for EU less-favored-area 
support (the support was extended to all of Finland in 2000); and at the time of 
accession Finland bargained for and was granted the right to pay additional 
northern aid to areas north of the 62nd parallel. In the estimation stage, we 
control for province and farm fixed effects, which may be correlated with the 
historical reference yields and average costs. We assume that the remaining 
variation in the payment rates is exogenous. Changes in payment rates over time 
have also been asymmetric across support regions.4 
                                              
4 The asymmetries arise from renegotiations with the EU on which parts of Finland are eligible for less-
favored-area support, from transitional support that was only payable during the first years in the EU and 
was gradually phased out, and from national payments in Southern Finland that have been renegotiated 
with the Commission every few years. 
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Figure 1.  Study area and delineation of agricultural support regions 
within the study area. 
 
Approximately 5% of participating farms are audited each year. The audits focus 
on farms’ compliance with the program requirements rather than on 
environmental outcomes. Nearly 40% of the farms randomly selected for audit in 
2006 received a reprimand or sanction for non-compliance (NAOF 2008).5 
Sanctions take the form of cuts in the current year’s program payments of up to 
30% for the general sub-program and up to 100% for the special sub-program. 
Violations of the limits on fertilizer application, for example, result in at most a 
9% cut in the current year’s payments (ARA 2011). Nitrogen fertilization rates 
for the sample of grain farms included in our empirical analysis also reflect weak 
enforcement of the FAEP input constraints. The proportion of farms that received 
agri-environmental payments yet appear to have violated the constraint on 
nitrogen application ranged from 33 to 61% over the study period.6 
                                              
5 Of the total number of audited farms, 75% are chosen through risk-based sampling and 25% through 
random sampling.  
6 Nitrogen fertilization rates for each year have been computed by dividing fertilizer expenditure by 
fertilizer price, under the assumption that farms use the compound fertilizer typically used in grain 
production in Finland (20% nitrogen content). Such rates are an approximation of the true application 
each year; inputs purchased in a given year are not necessarily applied in that year, as fertilizers can be 
stored.  
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3. Behavioral model: farms’ decisions on land 
allocation and input use 
3.1 Profit function, land use and input demand   
Farms maximize total profits over a set of crops. We assume that they consider 
input and output prices and agricultural support payment rates (including general 
agri-environmental support rates) to be exogenous.7 Finland’s overall cereal 
production amounted to 1-2% of the EU total in the years 1997-2007 (source: 
Eurostat), and price feedbacks are thus likely to be minor. Support payment rates 
are determined in negotiations between Finland and the EU and are based on 
historical yields, regional average costs of agri-environmental measures, and 
geographic location.  
The farms in the sample produce grain crops (barley, wheat, oats and rye) which 
are similar in terms of agricultural support payment rates, use of agri-chemicals, 
and environmental impacts. Under the agricultural conditions in Finland grains 
also have similar nutrient loading potential, and they are typically grouped 
together in land use analyses (see e.g. Helin, Laukkanen and Koikkalainen 2006 
and Ekholm et al. 2007). Thus, for simplicity, we aggregate across the grains in 
the analysis to follow. Farms may also leave land fallow, known as set-aside, 
which receives lower support payments and produces lower nutrient losses than 
land in grain production.  
A farm engaged in grain production decides how to allocate land to grains and 
set-aside based on their relative profitability. Once this decision is taken, the 
farm determines the profit-maximizing output level. By assumption, a farm 
considers only the private net benefits of farming, ignoring any environmental 
impacts. Grains and set-aside are both entitled to positive subsidy payments, 
proportional to land area, which include the CAP arable-area and less-favored-
area subsidies as well as Finnish national subsidies for crop production. Farms 
participating in the FAEP receive additional environmental subsidies, also 
proportional to land area. Moreover, farms participating in the special sub-
program within the FAEP earn special subsidy payments, which are generally 
based on the land area subject to a specific agri-environmental measure, such as 
riparian zone or wetland. 
                                              
7 Based on the results in Koundouri et al. (2009), we assume that farmers are risk-neutral. Using the same 
profitability bookkeeping data as the present study over the years 1992-2003, Koundouri et al. found 
evidence that farmers were risk-averse prior to Finland’s accession to the EU in 1995 and risk-loving 
thereafter, due to the increase in the non-random part of farm income brought by the introduction of the 
CAP. For the period 1995-2003, Koundouri et al. estimated the risk premium to be between -2 and 2% of 
farm profit. Given the small magnitude of the risk premium, we consider the assumption of risk-neutrality 
over the 1996-2005 period a reasonable approximation. 
 9 
 
 
Let L denote total land area of the farm, gl  the land allocated to grains, fl  set-
aside, gs  and fs  per hectare subsidy rates for grains and for set-aside, gp  grain 
price, gq  per hectare grain yield, kw  the kth component of the input vector, kr  
the corresponding input price, es  the special agri-environmental subsidy rate, and 
el  the land area under special environmental protection measures, which takes on 
a positive value only for farms that have signed contracts for undertaking special 
environmental protection measures. Farm profit is given by 
1
K
g g g g f f k k e e
k
l p q s l s r w l s

         .        (1) 
The representative farm is assumed to maximize profits given the total land area 
L, the output price gp , the vector of subsidy rates s , and the vector of input 
prices r . Maximizing the profit function yields optimal land allocation, input and 
output decisions  gl p,r,s ,  fl p,r,s ,  el p,r,s ,  kw p,r,s and  gq p,r,s . While 
the FAEP imposes limits on fertilizer use, we assume that farms do not consider 
this limit as a constraint in their input decision. In light of the relatively high non-
compliance rates within our sample and the fact that audits also frequently reveal 
non-compliance, we think that the assumption is in line with actual farm 
behavior.   
A well-behaved profit function must satisfy the following regularity conditions: 
homogeneity of degree one in prices, convexity in prices, monotonicity, and 
symmetry. The assumption of a given total land area imposes an additional land 
adding-up condition:  
0      ,   g f g f g fe e eg f e
g g g j j j k k k
l l l l l ll l ll l l L k j
p p p s s s r r r
                                   
(2) 
1g f e
l l l
L L L
       ,                                   (3) 
where js  denotes the jth component of the subsidy vector.  
3.2 Model specification 
We specify a quadratic profit function written as a function of the exogenous 
variables ,gp  ,s  and r . The quadratic form provides a flexible approximation of 
the true profit function. We normalize the profit function by dividing the profit, 
prices, and subsidies by the price of one input, labor. Conditions (2) and (3), as 
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well as homogeneity of profit with respect to prices, are then easily imposed. The 
quadratic profit function is  
1 1 1
0
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
2
' ' ' '
1 ' 1 1 1 1
1
1 1
1 1 1 1     
2 2 2 2
     ,
J K K J K
p s r pr sr
g g j j k k k g k jk j k
j k k j k
J J J K K
pp ss ps rr
gg g jj j j gj gc j kk k k
j j j k k
J K
p s r
g g j j k k
j k
p s r p r s r
p s s p s r r
p L s L r L
     
   
  
  
    
 
    

 
      
   
  
   
  
 
                  (4) 
where J indexes the subsidy rates (for grains, set-aside, and special agri-
environmental measures) and K the inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, labor), and the 
upper bar indicates normalized profit, price and subsidy variables. That is, 
Kr   , g g Kp p r , j j Ks s r , k k Kr r r , where Kr  is the price of the 
numeraire, here labor.  
Differentiating the profit function with respect to prices and per-hectare subsidy 
rates yields  
g g
g
l q
p
 
1
1 1
K J
p pr pp ps p
g k k gg g gj j g
k j
r p s L    
 
     ,       (5) 
where g gl q  is the total grain output; 
j
j
l
s
 
1
' '
1 ' 1
K J
s sr ss ps s
j jk k jj j gj gc j
k j
r s p L    
 
     ,   J = (grains, set-aside);      (6) 
where  and g sl l  are land allocated to grains and set-aside, respectively; and 
k
k
w
r
  
1
' '
1 ' 1
,
J K
r pr sr rr r
k k g jk j kk k k
j k
p s r L    
 
       K=(fertilizers, pesticides); (7) 
where  and f pw w  represent input demand for fertilizers and pesticides, respectively.  
We are only able to estimate land allocation equations for grains ( gl ) and set-
aside ( fl ) since our data do not specify the land area subject to special agri-
environmental protection measures ( el ), but only the total amount of special agri-
environmental subsidies received ( e el s ).The estimation stage controls for the fact 
that some farms receive the special agri-environmental subsidy as well as for the 
amount they receive, and for the implications the payments have for farms’ input 
use, land allocation, and grain yield (selection bias). 
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The elasticities of output, inputs, and grain and set-aside areas with respect to any 
price or subsidy rate can be recovered easily from equations (5) to (7). They are 
computed by multiplying the corresponding parameter (coefficient of price or 
subsidy rate in the land or output equation) by the ratio of the normalized price 
(or subsidy rate) and land area, output or input level. For example, the elasticity 
of grain area with respect to the (normalized) price of grain, ,g gl p , is calculated 
as follows: 
,g g
gps
l p gg
g
p
l
       
.          (8) 
From equations (6), the land adding up condition (2) implies the following 
parameter constraints:  
'
1 1 1
1
0  ,  ';  
1.
J J J
sr ss ps
jk jj gj
J j j
J
s
j
j
k j  

  

    

  

              (9) 
A further constraint is imposed by the CAP mandatory set-aside mechanism, 
which requires farms to leave a proportion of land fallow each year.8 Small farms 
are exempt from the requirement. The set-aside subsidy is only paid to set-aside 
area exceeding the mandatory area. To deal with the presence of voluntary and 
mandatory set-aside, we proceed as follows: if a farm’s observed set-aside area 
exceeds the CAP requirement, we treat the difference as voluntary set-aside and 
include it in the land set-aside equation. If the observed set-aside is less than the 
CAP requirement, we assume that the farm is exempt and that its entire set-aside 
area is voluntary. Finally, if the reported set-aside area equals the CAP 
requirement, we assume that there is no voluntary set-aside, and assign the value 
zero to set-aside in the land allocation equation.  
Land allocation and output are also influenced by factors that are unobservable to 
the analyst. These factors can be either period specific (e.g. weather and pests) or 
farm specific (e.g. soil quality and farmer skills) (Wu et al. 2004, Lacroix and 
Thomas 2011). Using panel data allows us to partly compensate for the lack of 
farm-level soil and weather information, and facilitates control of unobserved 
individual heterogeneity.  
 
                                              
8 Set-aside was compulsory for farms receiving EU CAP arable area payments in 1992-2007. The 
requirement was initially set at 15% of total land, then altered to between 5% and 10% from 1996 on. As 
a rule, vegetation cover must be maintained on set-aside and the use of fertilizers is not permitted.  
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3.3 Estimation methodology 
We estimate the profit function simultaneously with the demand functions 
(derived from the profit function) for fertilizers and pesticides (labor being the 
numeraire), the equations for land allocated to grains and set-aside, and total 
grain output, all subject to the constraints implied by the land adding-up 
conditions (equations 9). The system of equations for farm i in year t is written as 
follows: 
                                                 (10) 
 
The exogenous explanatory variables are the output price gp , the vector of 
subsidy rates s , the vector of input prices r , and total land L. All prices and 
subsidies are normalized by the price of labor. As described in the previous 
section, the function  1 .g  is quadratic in all parameters, while the functions 
 2 .g  to  6 .g  are linear. The terms 1 i  to 6 i  represent farm-specific unobserved 
effects and are assumed to be fixed parameters. The terms 1,itu  to 6,itu  are 
idiosyncratic error terms, possibly correlated across equations, and by 
assumption of mean zero. 
Three main econometric issues have to be addressed here: i) some farms do not 
have any land in voluntary set-aside (i.e., , 0f itl  )9; ii) a subset of farms receives 
the special agri-environmental subsidy; and iii) the farm-specific effects (
1 6 to i i  ) could be correlated with some explanatory variables.  
In order to deal with the problem of corner solutions for set-aside land, we follow 
the approach presented by Shonkwiler and Yen (1999). The Shonkwiler-Yen 
approach, which allows one to estimate a system of equations when some of the 
dependent variables are censored, involves working with the non-conditional 
expectation of the censored variables. Details are provided in Appendix 1.  
 
                                              
9 Voluntary set-aside ( fl ) is equal to zero for about 13% of observations in our sample.   
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The special agri-environmental subsidy is received only by farms that agree to 
undertake certain specific environmental protection measures. We only observe 
the total amount of the special agri-environmental subsidies, not the type of 
measures adopted or the area where these measures are implemented. Because 
our objective is to analyze the impact of the FAEP on farms’ production 
decisions, it is important to control for the fact that some farms receive the 
special subsidy and for the amount received, since these may have direct 
implications for farms’ input use, land allocation, and grain output. In order to 
control for a possible selection bias due to farms opting to join the special sub-
program, we run a first-stage random-effects Tobit regression with the amount of 
the special agri-environmental subsidies received by the farm as the dependent 
variable. The independent variables in this model are the farmer’s age, the price 
of pesticides, the price of labor, the share of the total land which is rented, the 
price of grain, the number of animals on the farm, total farm size, and province 
dummies (our sample covers 17 provinces). The estimation of the Tobit model 
takes into account the panel form of the data and relies on the assumption that the 
unobserved farm effects are not correlated with the model’s explanatory 
variables. The amount of the special agri-environmental subsidies predicted from 
the estimation of the random-effect Tobit model is then incorporated into the 
right-hand side of each equation in the system.   
In order to control for possible correlation between unobserved farm-specific 
effects and some of the explanatory variables when estimating the system of 
equations, we apply the Within transformation to all variables and estimate a 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (SURE) model. The Within 
transformation, which deviates variables from their individual means, cancels out 
time-constant unobserved individual effects. 
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4. Data 
This study uses farm-level data on physical and financial variables for 
agricultural production, obtained from bookkeeping records that provide the 
Finnish data for the European Commission’s Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN).10 The records are collected annually following EU accounting 
guidelines and contain information on crop areas, crop yield, expenditures on 
fertilizers and pesticides, work hours, and compensatory payments received, 
including agri-environmental payments, for a total of some 900 farms each year. 
While the data distinguish payments made through the FAEP general and special 
sub-programs, they do not specify the agri-environmental measures adopted or 
the area on which contract-based special measures have been implemented. The 
analysis spans the years 1996-2005, that is, from Finland’s second year in the EU 
to the last year when crop-specific CAP arable-area payments were used.11 The 
final sample used in the analysis includes farms that are located in one of the four 
southernmost support regions, that had some land allocated to grain crops, and 
that attributed a maximum of 30% of their total variable costs to animal 
production. The resulting data comprise 343 farms and 1,564 observations (an 
unbalanced panel).12  
Full-time farm enterprises are overrepresented in the bookkeeping data, whereby 
the average farm size is larger than the national average. This feature is also 
present in our sample. Otherwise, the sample is representative of grain farms in 
Finland. The patterns of farm size across time and geographic location are similar 
for the sample and for national data. Average farm size increases over the period 
1996-2005, and decreases from south to north (Appendix 2 Tables A2.1 and 
A2.2). In terms of the geographic location of the farms, Southern Finland 
(support regions A and B) is somewhat overrepresented in our sample (Tables 
A2.3 and A2.4). Fertilizer purchases in proportion to cultivated land in the 
sample show a pattern that is similar to national statistics (Tables A2.5 and A2.6 
in Appendix 2).  
The farm data were complemented with average national crop prices collected 
from Finnish Agriculture and Rural Industries, published by MTT Agrifood 
Research annually, and with price indices for fertilizers and pesticides 
                                              
10 The bookkeeping records are collected by Finland’s FADN Liaison Agency (MTT Agrifood Research 
Finland). The FADN data are harmonized across EU countries in that the bookkeeping principles are the 
same.  
11 The bookkeeping data do not have separate entries for agri-environmental support and other 
compensatory payments for 1995, Finland’s year of accession to the EU. The EU single-farm payment, a 
result of the 2003 CAP reform, was introduced in Finland in 2006. The single-farm payment to farmers is 
based on the land that they manage or own, not on the crops that they produce.     
12 The support regions A to C2 are located between the 60th and 65th parallels and contain 98% of 
Finland’s grain production area. In terms of the FADN farming type classification, we selected farms 
operating in lines 1, 2 and 8, or, in FADN8 typology, field crops, horticulture, and mixed, respectively.   
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(100=2005) and labor prices, obtained from Statistics Finland (Table A3 in 
Appendix 3). The average hourly wage for forest maintenance work was used as 
a proxy for the labor price as statistics on agricultural wages are not available. 
The same input price indices were applied to all farms; that is, indices vary only 
across years. For grain price we computed region-specific values using the farm-
level data on revenues, yields, and areas used for barley, wheat, oats and rye, 
complemented by the national statistics on crop prices. Total grain output for 
each farm was calculated as the ratio of grain revenue to the region-specific grain 
price.13 The per-hectare subsidy rates for grains and set-aside used in the analysis 
are the sums of the CAP arable-area, CAP less-favored-area, national crop 
production, northern aid, and general agri-environmental support rates applicable 
to each land use and each support region. The subsidy rates, which differ across 
the support regions, were ascertained from Finnish Agriculture and Rural 
Industries. The CAP arable-crop subsidy for each support region was calculated 
as the weighted average of the subsidies for barley, wheat, oats and rye, where 
the weights were the average shares of land allocated to each crop in the support 
region on the farms in our sample.  
Summary statistics (Table 1) show that on average the grain area per farm 
increased over the study period. This trend is similar to the one observed for 
Finland on the whole (see e.g. Niemi and Ahlstedt 2005). The intensity of 
production in terms of fertilizer use decreased on average, also reflecting the 
national trend (Table A2.5).  
Table 1.  Mean levels of grain and set-aside areas and fertilizer use in the 
sample   
Year Grain area Set-aside area Fertilizer use 
per hectare 
(hectares) (hectares) (quantity index) 
1996 34.3 3.1 145.3 
1997 36.8 3.6 153.2 
1998 36.9 3.2 147.3 
1999 39.2 3.7 151.1 
2000 40.5 2.4 144.6 
2001 40.0 2.9 128.8 
2002 41.7 3.1 127.8 
2003 41.5 3.9 126.1 
2004 44.5 4.2 126.3 
2005 45.1 3.3 124.5 
                                              
13 Because data on grain revenue were missing for some farms and we sought to avoid a misreporting 
error, grain revenue for each farm and each year was computed as the median (per-hectare) grain revenue 
in the support region in that year multiplied by the grain area of the farm. 
 16 
 
As shown in Table 2, the total subsidies in proportion to land area increased over 
the study period. The subsidies paid for areas in grain production increased on 
average, while the subsidies for set-aside (in constant terms) decreased over the 
study period. The general FAEP payments in proportion to land area decreased 
slightly on average. The proportion of farms participating in the FAEP special 
sub-program in our sample increased over the study period, whereas the average 
amount of special environmental subsidies in proportion to farm area among 
special sub-program participants decreased. 
Table 2.  Percentages of farms receiving general and special FAEP 
payments and mean levels of subsidies received in proportion to 
land area (EUR 2005) 
Year Mean total 
subsidiesa 
Mean 
subsidies 
for grainsa  
Mean 
subsidies for 
set-asidea  
Mean 
FAEP 
general 
subsidies 
Farms with 
special 
FAEP 
payments  
Mean FAEP 
special 
subsidiesb  
 
(EUR/ha) 
 
(EUR/ha) 
  
(EUR/ha) (EUR/ha) (%) 
 
(EUR/ha) 
1996 471 475 440 122 12% 91 
1997 478 483 431 122 14% 66 
1998 495 502 423 118 19% 59 
1999 460 464 418 120 20% 55 
2000 548 561 380 91 15% 44 
2001 535 551 370 87 21% 57 
2002 554 571 377 86 19% 49 
2003 535 554 374 84 25% 46 
2004 543 559 373 85 29% 43 
2005 560 578 369 97 29% 51 
 
a Includes the CAP arable-area and less-favored-area subsidies, national crop production aid, and FAEP 
general subsidies. 
b Mean payments in proportion to land area for farms that participate in the FAEP special sub-program.  
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5. Estimation results 
The first-stage Tobit regression, with the amount of the FAEP special sub-
program payments received by the farm as the dependent variable, is significant 
overall (the Wald test statistic is significant at the one-percent level).14 The 
farmer’s age has a statistically significant negative effect on the amount of 
special sub-program payments, whereas the price of labor, the number of animals 
on the farm, and farm size have a statistically significant positive effect. These 
signs are consistent with expectations: Younger farmers are likely to be more 
educated and have longer horizons regarding farm operation, meaning that they 
are likely to be more competent and more willing to invest time and effort in the 
environmental planning required by the special sub-program. The special sub-
program measures applicable to a grain farm typically remove land from 
production through conversion into riparian zones or wetlands. The finding that a 
higher price of labor, a higher time commitment for animal care, and larger farm 
size increase the amount of special sub-program payments received is consistent 
with the removal of land from production and thus reduced labor requirements. 
Location in a province along the west coast of Finland also has a statistically 
significant positive effect, a finding that may be explained by proximity to the 
Baltic Sea and the resulting greater awareness among farmers of the sea’s 
nutrient-related water quality problems. 
In the second stage, the six-equation system described in (10) was estimated on a 
total of 1,564 observations; the standard errors and t-statistics were obtained 
using bootstrapping techniques.15 Chi-squared tests indicate overall significance 
in the case of each of the six equations. Our main interest is the impact of crop 
area-based subsidies, set-aside subsidies and special environmental subsidies on 
land allocated to grain and set-aside as well as on the application of fertilizers 
and pesticides. The estimated coefficients for the corresponding four equations 
are shown in Table A4 in Appendix 4.16  
Table 3 presents the median elasticities calculated on the basis of the estimated 
coefficients. All subsidy elasticities of grain and set-aside areas and input use are 
statistically significant. Area-based subsidies for grains and set-aside both had a 
fairly small impact on the grain-producing area. The median elasticity of grain 
area with respect to the grain subsidies is 0.15, which is close to the estimate 
reported in Lacroix and Thomas (2011). Using individual farm data from France, 
those authors found an elasticity of 0.16 for land planted with cereals with 
respect to area-based subsidies for cereals. By contrast, area-based subsidies for 
                                              
14 The full Tobit regression results are available from the authors upon request.  
15 Monetary values have been converted into 2005 EUR using the consumer price index (source: Statistics 
Finland). 
16 The full set of estimated coefficients is available from the authors upon request. 
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set-aside area had a large impact on the set-aside area in our sample: the median 
elasticity is 1.52, whereas Lacroix and Thomas report an elasticity of 0.12. Area-
based subsidies for grains also increased total use of fertilizers and pesticides, 
although the impacts were small (elasticities of 0.01 and 0.04). The special 
environmental subsidies had a positive but very small impact on land planted 
with grains and a negative impact on land set-aside for the farms that participate 
in the FAEP special sub-program. We have also found that the subsidies 
provided through the FAEP special sub-program decreased total fertilizer use but 
that the impact was small in magnitude: a 1% increase in the special agri-
environmental subsidy resulted in only a 0.05% decrease in total fertilizer use. 
The special environmental subsidies increased the total use of pesticides but this 
effect was also small in magnitude. 
To check the consistency of our estimates, we also calculated own price 
elasticities, which were all statistically significant (at the one-percent level of 
significance). The (median) elasticity of grain area to grain price is 0.30, whereas 
the own price elasticities of the demand for fertilizers and pesticides are -0.91 
and -1.96, respectively. 
Table 3.  Elasticities of land allocation and agrichemical input use 
Variable Elasticity Significancea 
Elasticities with respect to total land-area based subsidies to grains 
  
Grain area 0.149 *** 
Set-aside area -2.012 *** 
Total fertilizer use  0.010 *** 
Total pesticide use 0.036 *** 
Elasticities with respect to total set-aside subsidies 
Grain area -0.108 *** 
Set-aside area 1.516 *** 
Total fertilizer use  -0.008 *** 
Total pesticide use -0.028 *** 
Elasticities with respect to the special environmental subsidyb 
Grain area 0.007 ** 
Set-aside area -0.095 ** 
Total fertilizer use  -0.052 * 
Total pesticide use 0.063 ** 
 
a ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
b Calculated using the sub-sample of farmers receiving the special environmental subsidy.  
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6. Simulations 
To assess the impact of the FAEP payments on nutrient pollution from 
agricultural land, we apply the estimated land allocation and fertilizer demand 
functions to simulate two policy scenarios: (1) a “factual” scenario, where the 
FAEP payments are set at their historical values for 1996-2005, and (2) a 
counterfactual no-policy scenario, where the FAEP payments (both general and 
special) are set at zero. All other variables, including compensatory payments 
through the CAP and national crop production aid, remain at their actual 
historical values under both scenarios in order to identify the effects of the FAEP 
payments. Comparing the factual simulation with the counterfactual allows us to 
isolate the effects of the FAEP payments on land allocation and input use, 
assuming all else has remained constant.   
The results in Table 4 indicate that the impacts of the FAEP payments on land 
allocation and fertilizer use in our sample were minor. In terms of land 
allocation, the impact is counterproductive in that the payments increase the grain 
area and reduce set-aside (grassland), which, other things being equal, would 
increase nutrient loading. Our finding that the FAEP payments increased the area 
under cultivation is in line with previous results. Pufahl and Weiss (2009) found 
that the area under cultivation for participants in the German AEPs grew by 7.7% 
on average from 2000 to 2005, while the growth rate was only 4.2% for farmers 
not participating in an AEP.17 In terms of fertilizer use, the impact goes in the 
desired direction, but is small: the FAEP payments resulted in a less than 2% 
reduction in fertilizer use in the sample, again in line with the findings of Pufahl 
and Weiss (2009) for Germany.  
  
                                              
17 Results from a comprehensive analysis of land-use changes in the US, based on micro-level data, also 
suggest that federal farm payments have boosted crop acreage, partially offsetting cropland retirement 
induced by the CRP and falling net returns on crops (Lubowski, Plantinga and Stavins 2008). Findings 
from a farm-level analysis of the production effects of US farm programs also suggest that government 
programs, even largely decoupled payments, increase growth in farm size (Key, Lubowski and Roberts 
2005). 
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Table 4.  Land allocation and fertilizer use in the sample under the 
prevailing policy and under a counterfactual scenario, where 
FAEP payments equal zero. 
Variable EU agricultural 
policy and agri-
environmental 
subsidies at 
historical values 
EU agricultural 
policy and no  
agri-environmental 
subsidies 
Percentage change 
produced by  
agri- environmental 
subsidies 
 (prevailing policy) (counterfactual) (%) 
Total grain area (ha) 64,396 63,042 2.1 
Total set-aside area 
(ha) 5,237 6,591 -20.5 
Total fertilizer use 
(1,000 kg) 35,262 35,803 -1.5 
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7. Benefits and costs of the agri-environmental 
payments 
Changes in land allocation and fertilizer use will affect nutrient pollution from 
agricultural land. We now proceed to assess the impact of FAEP payments on 
this environmental outcome in our sample of grain farms. Specifically, we use 
the predicted land allocation and fertilizer intensity under the “factual” baseline 
and the no-policy counterfactual scenario as inputs in environmental production 
functions in order to quantify the impact of program payments on nutrient 
pollution. To evaluate program-induced reductions in nutrient pollution in 
monetary terms, we couple the simulated nutrient load reductions with results 
from a valuation study assessing the benefits of reducing nutrient loads from 
Finland to the Baltic Sea. 
Nutrient loading is affected by not only changes in nutrient inputs and land use 
but also the conservation measures adopted. Among the key measures that the 
FAEP imposes on grain farms are field margins along main drains and filter 
strips along waterways.18 Farms participating in the FAEP special sub-program 
may also have agreed to construct wider riparian zones along waterways. In what 
follows, we refer to all of these buffers as vegetative filter strips. Another 
common conservation measure is maintaining wintertime vegetation on part of 
the arable area, a mandatory measure in southern Finland in the first program 
period (1995-1999). Unfortunately, our data do not record the extent of 
vegetative filter strips and wintertime vegetation on the sample farms. As an 
approximation, we apply the proportion of the total field area covered by 
vegetative filter strips and wintertime vegetation for all the farms participating in 
the FAEP. This information has been obtained from the farm surveys, farmer 
interview studies, and administrative records on FAEP additional measures and 
special sub-program contracts that are summarized in MAF (2004). The FAEP-
imposed vegetative filter strips and wintertime vegetation are removed in the no-
policy scenario, while CAP requirements for field margins remain in place under 
both scenarios. 
7.1 Environmental production functions 
Degradation of the surface water quality in the Baltic Sea, the main recipient of 
nutrient loads from agriculture in Finland, is governed by the joint presence of 
nitrogen and phosphorus (see e.g. Tamminen and Andersen 2007). We predict 
nutrient loads using environmental production functions, one for nitrogen and 
two for the focal forms of phosphorus, dissolved and particulate. The first 
                                              
18 The FAEP requires a 1 m wide field margin with permanent vegetation along main drains and 3 m wide 
filter strips with permanent vegetation along streams and other waterways. The CAP arable-area 
payments also require field margins 0.6 m in width along main drains and waterways. 
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function was developed in Simmelsgaard (1991) and Simmelsgaard and Djurhus 
(1998), and the last two in Uusitalo and Jansson (2002). These functions relate 
fertilization intensity to nutrient loading using coefficients that capture the 
impacts of crop choice, tillage practice, soil and field characteristics, and climatic 
factors. The coefficients have been calibrated by Helin, Laukkanen and 
Koikkalainen (2006) to correspond to the average soil characteristics, field slope 
and climatic conditions in southern Finland. As we do not have information on 
the environmental characteristics of the farms, we apply the parameterization for 
average conditions in southern Finland as an approximation.19 All in all, the 
results for nutrient losses conform to findings for different land uses and fertilizer 
intensities in Finnish field experiments. Similar environmental production 
functions have been applied in Lankoski, Ollikainen and Uusitalo (2006) and 
Laukkanen and Nauges (2011). We next describe the environmental production 
functions briefly; for a more detailed description, we refer the reader to Helin, 
Laukkanen and Koikkalainen (2006) and Lankoski, Ollikainen and Uusitalo 
(2006).   
The notation in the environmental production functions is as follows: indexes N, 
DP and PP refer to nitrogen, dissolved phosphorus and particulate phosphorus; 
,m j  is a parameter summarizing the impact of land use and tillage j (grains, 
grains with wintertime vegetation, set-aside) and local soil, field and climatic 
conditions on the loss of nutrient m, with  , ,m N DP PP ; ms  and md  are the 
shares of nutrient m loss carried through surface and drainage flow; B denotes the 
share of land allocated to vegetative filter strips; mb  is a parameter capturing the 
effect of such strips on the loss of nutrient m; N  is a reference nitrogen 
fertilization level; and   is the soil phosphorus level. We consider a compound 
fertilizer with 20% nitrogen and 3% phosphorus content.20 Given a predicted 
fertilizer quantity x , the amounts of nitrogen and phosphorus applied are 
0.20Nx x  and 0.03Px x .  
Drawing on the nitrogen loss function by Simmelsgaard (1991) and 
Simmelsgaard and Djurhus (1998), the nitrogen load (kg/ha) under land use j is 
given by  
   , , 1 exp 0.71 / 1          NbN j N j N N Nz B s d x N ,     (10) 
                                              
19 The study region in Helin, Laukkanen and Koikkalainen (2006) covers approximately support regions 
A and B in our study. The calibration draws on physical models predicting nitrogen and phosphorus loads 
(SOIL-N and IceCream, respectively) and monitoring data on nitrogen and phosphorus loads from 
agricultural land.  
20 This mix was the most commonly used mix for grains in the study period in Finland, recommended for 
example by the Pro Agria agricultural advisory center’s on-line farm management tool Tuottopehtori.   
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Total phosphorus loss contains two forms of phosphorus, dissolved and 
particulate. Drawing on Saarela et al. (1995) and Uusitalo and Jansson (2002), 
the dissolved phosphorus loss (kg/ha) is given by 
    4, , 1 2 0.01 1.5 10             DPbDP j DP j DP DP Pz B s d x     (11) 
and the particulate phosphorus loss (kg/ha) by  
     6, , 1 250ln 0 01 150 10PPbPP j PP j PP PP Pz B s d θ . x          .    (12)  
Table 5 shows the nutrient loss parameters ,m j  calibrated by Helin, Laukkanen 
and Koikkalainen (2006) and the reference nitrogen fertilization level for each 
crop. We consider aggregate grain production and consequently use a weighted 
average of the parameters in Table 5 to describe nutrient loading from grain 
areas. Based on MAF (2004), the share of field area covered by vegetative filter 
strips on farms that participate in the FAEP was set at 0.29% for 1996-1999 and 
0.40% in 2000-2005, while the share of field area under vegetative filter strips on 
non-participating farms was set at 0.04% (CAP field margin). The parameter 
estimates for vegetative filter strip impact, 0.2Nb , 1.3DPb  and 0.3PPb , 
were obtained from Lankoski, Ollikainen and Uusitalo (2006).21 The proportions 
of nutrient loss occurring through surface flow ( ms ) were set at 0.5, 0.7 and 0.7 
for nitrogen, dissolved phosphorus and particulate phosphorus, respectively, 
which correspond to the average values in Turtola and Paajanen (1995). The soil 
phosphorus levels ( ) used in the analysis are soil test averages for each province 
in our sample for the periods 1996-2000 and 2001-2005, obtained from 
Viljavuuspalvelu Oy (Soil Testing Service Ltd.).22 The share of field area under 
wintertime vegetation was set at 30% in support regions A and B and 0% 
elsewhere in the years 1996-1999, which is an approximation based on the FAEP 
requirements for that period. In the years 2000-2005 the share was set at 14.8%, 
the average on farms participating in the FAEP in the period (MAF 2004). The 
most common way to maintain vegetation in the winter has been reduced tillage 
(MAF 2004), and we apply nutrient load parameters corresponding to reduced 
tillage on the grain area covered by wintertime vegetation. The price of the 
compound fertilizer was set at the 2002 price, 0.23 EUR/kg. 
 
                                              
21 Lankoski, Ollikainen and Uusitalo (2006) have calibrated the model to conform to data from Finnish 
experimental studies on grass filter strips (Uusi-Kämppä and Yläranta 1992, Uusi-Kämppä and Yläranta 
1996). 
22 Viljavuuspalvelu Oy is a commercial soil test laboratory and the market leader in soil testing in 
Finland. Soil testing is required for farms participating in the FAEP. Consequently, the soil test data 
provided by Viljavuuspalvelu Oy provide a reasonable picture of agricultural land in Finland.  
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Table 5.  Nutrient load parameters (from Helin, Laukkanen and 
Koikkalainen 2006).23  
Crop Spring wheat Winter wheat Barley Oats Set-aside 
Tillagea CT RT CT RT CT RT CT RT CT RT 
N  24 24 21 21 21 20 12 12 12 12 
DP  326 357 355 355 316 342 323 347 197 197 
PP  1471 634 1415 1384 1373 540 1401 563 56 56 
N  100 100 120 120 90 90 90 90 0 0 
a CT, conventional tillage; RT, reduced tillage (chisel plow). 
 
7.2 Monetary benefits of reduced nutrient pollution 
Assessing the welfare effects of agri-environmental payments calls for a 
monetary measure of the benefits of reduced nutrient pollution. Developing such 
a measure of non-market benefits is complicated by the fact that degradation of 
the quality of surface water in the Baltic Sea is governed by the joint presence of 
nitrogen and phosphorus. Indeed, valuation studies generally address water 
quality improvements that are attributable to the combined effect of changes in 
nitrogen and phosphorus loads entering the water ecosystem (Söderqvist 1996, 
1998, Markowska and Zylicz 1999, Kosenius 2010). Accordingly, what is 
needed for assessing the benefits of reduced nutrient pollution on the basis of 
valuation studies is a composite measure of nitrogen and phosphorus loads.     
We consider a weighted sum of nitrogen and phosphorus as such a composite 
measure. Thus, environmental damage in our analysis is connected to a 
composite nutrient load NPz , defined as 
NP N Pz z az  ,         (13) 
where Nz is the nitrogen load and Pz  the sum of dissolved and particulate 
phosphorus loads. We consider two alternative weights on phosphorus:  1a  and 
 7.2a . The weight  7.2a  reflects the prevalence of nitrogen-fixing blue-green 
algae in the Baltic Sea. These organisms are able to bind nitrogen from the 
atmosphere to phosphorus in the water. Due to nitrogen fixation, phosphorus 
entering the water ecosystem can result in the conversion of an average of 7.2 
                                              
23 For particulate phosphorus, Helin, Laukkanen and Koikkalainen (2006) report parameter values 
corresponding to bioavailable nutrients. We have divided these values by the bioavailability coefficient 
for particulate phosphorus, 0.16,  to obtain PP  parameters corresponding to total particulate phosphorus 
load, as the benefit estimates used in this study pertain to total nutrients.  
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times its weight of atmospheric nitrogen into a form available to aquatic plants, 
thereby potentially causing 7.2 times more eutrophication than nitrogen.24  
We use results obtained by Kosenius (2010) to assess the benefits of reduced 
nutrient pollution. Kosenius conducted a choice experiment to assess Finns’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) for water quality improvements associated with 
reducing land-based nitrogen and phosphorus loads to coastal areas in the Baltic 
Sea adjacent to Finland (the Gulf of Finland and the Archipelago Sea). The water 
quality attributes in the experiment corresponded to forecasts by Baltic Sea 
ecosystem models. The scenario relevant to this study reduced Finland’s nitrogen 
and phosphorus loads by 7,986 and 525 tons per year, relative to the 1997-2002 
levels, over a 20-year time frame.25 The estimated annual WTP by the Finnish 
population for these nutrient load reductions ranged from 652 million euros for a 
multinomial logit to 945 million euros for a random parameters logit model, with 
95% confidence intervals of (602-702) and (891-998) million euros, 
respectively.26 We computed a constant marginal benefit by dividing the annual 
national WTP by the annual nutrient load reduction underlying the choice 
experiment scenario, measured in terms of a composite nutrient load reduction 
(equation 13). Table 6 displays the constant marginal benefit measures 
corresponding to the multinomial logit and random parameters logit models (in 
2005 prices).   
  
                                              
24 The algae production function is essentially a fixed-proportion one, with the ratio of nitrogen and 
phosphorus in algae output averaging 7.2 (Redfield, Ketchum and Richards 1963). 
25 The other scenarios concerned intensified wastewater treatment in Russia and reductions in Polish 
loads to the Baltic Proper. The ecosystem model forecasts and the load reduction scenarios are described 
in Pitkänen et al. (2007).    
26 The choice experiment in Kosenius (2010), carried out in 2005, presented respondents with a scenario 
where a tax would be imposed for 20 years to finance the load reductions, and water quality 
improvements would be realized at the end of the 20-year time period. Kosenius also studied a latent class 
model. We do not consider the willingness to pay estimates from this model in our analysis as they were 
not weighted for population representativeness.   
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Table 6.  Constant marginal benefit of reducing nutrient loads from 
Finland, in euros per kg of composite nitrogen-phosphorus load 
(95% confidence intervals in parenthesis) 
Composite nutrient 
load measure 
Multinomial logit Random parameters logit 
Phosphorus weight 1 77 (71-83) 111 (105-117) 
Phosphorus weight 7.2 55 (51-60) 80 (76-85) 
 
7.3 Benefit-cost comparison 
The impact of agri-environmental payments on social welfare comprises changes 
in consumer surplus and producer surplus. Our approach enables an assessment 
of both. However, to achieve transparent comparisons with a previous EU AEP 
study, that by Chabe-Ferret and Subervie (2012), we focus on consumer surplus, 
measured by the environmental benefits in terms of nutrient load reductions 
attributable to FAEP payments.27 On the cost side, we consider the direct costs of 
the FAEP payments (agri-environmental subsidies paid to farms), administrative 
costs, and the opportunity cost of public funds. Based on NAOF (2008), the 
administrative costs of the FAEP amount to approximately 10% of all program 
payments. A plausible value for the opportunity cost of public funds in Finland is 
1.15.28   
Nutrient load reductions attributable to the FAEP payments were simulated using 
environmental production functions (10) to (12), the land allocation and input use 
under the factual and the no-policy counterfactual simulations (Table 4), and the 
shares of vegetative filter strips and wintertime vegetation attributable to the 
FAEP according to MAF (2004). The estimated effect of the FAEP payments 
was to reduce nitrogen loading from the sample of grain farms by 2.5 kg/ha, or 
11%, and phosphorus loading by 0.2 kg/ha, or 13%, over 1996-2005.29 The 
consequences of these changes for damage to the surface water quality of the 
Baltic Sea are reported in Table 7.30 Part A in the table displays the estimated 
                                              
27 The impact of the FAEP payments on producer surplus in our sample is also small, amounting on 
average to 1 EUR/ha/year over the 1996-2005 period.      
28 Kuismanen (2000), using a labor supply model, estimated the dead-weight loss of Finnish taxation to 
be 15%.   
29 The total nitrogen loads for the factual and counterfactual simulations were 1,335 tons and 1,507 tons, 
and total phosphorus loads 85 tons and 98 tons. The corresponding average nitrogen loads were 19.2 
kg/ha and 21.6 kg/ha, and the average phosphorus loads 1.2 kg/ha and 1.4 kg/ha. The environmental 
simulation performs well in reproducing magnitudes of nutrient loads that are in line with ecological 
assessments of nutrient loading from agricultural areas in Finland (Rekolainen et al. 1995, Vuorenmaa et 
al. 2002).  
30 While a significant proportion of the nutrient loading from farms in Finland is transported into the 
Baltic Sea, some of the nutrients are retained in inland waters. As our damage estimates are for the Baltic 
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damage from nutrient loading originating from the sample farms for each 
scenario and for alternative damage parameterizations. The simulated nitrogen 
and phosphorus loads have been summarized in a composite nutrient load, which 
has then been priced at the constant marginal damage estimates in Table 6. Part B 
shows the overall change in damage and the benefit-cost ratio for the FAEP 
payments to the sample farms. Overall, the effect of the FAEP payments was to 
reduce the damage from grain production by 11 to 12%. These estimates 
combine the reduction in the per-hectare nutrient load from grain areas stemming 
from decreased fertilizer use as well as the increase in grain area and decrease in 
set-aside area that are attributable to the agri-environmental payments. 
The total damage avoided in the sample is robust to the choice of composite 
nutrient load measure but quite sensitive to the model used to obtain the 
underlying WTP estimates. For the multinomial logit specification, the benefits 
produced by the FAEP payments to our sample clearly fall short of the costs, 
with benefit-cost ratios estimated at 0.68 to 0.73. For the random parameters logit 
specification, the benefits are approximately on par with the costs, with benefit-
cost ratios estimated at 0.99 to 1.05. The superiority of one WTP model over 
another is not straightforward. However, Kosenius (2010) found support for 
heterogeneous preferences for water quality attributes, which speaks for the use 
of the random parameters logit model over the basic multinomial logit. It should 
also be noted that our assessment of environmental benefits focuses on the 
implications of the FAEP payments for surface water quality in the Baltic Sea. 
Additional benefits may be attributable to reductions in the application of 
pesticides, increases in biodiversity and improvements in water quality in 
Finland’s inland waters. We have not been able to evaluate these changes as there 
are no empirical studies available on the relevant impacts and non-market 
benefits. On balance, our findings indicate that the FAEP has merits in terms of 
reducing agriculturally produced nutrient loading.   
  
                                                                                                                                    
Sea, the damage measures in Table 7 have been calculated on basis of the nutrient loads estimated to 
reach the sea. For nitrogen we set the proportion retained in inland waters at 22%, the average for Finland 
(Lepistö et al. 2006). The retention rate for phosphorus was determined from an empirical regression 
model that predicts nutrient fluxes with field and lake percentages as explanatory factors (Rankinen et al. 
2010). The resulting phosphorus retention rate is 46%. Thus, approximately 78% of the nitrogen load and 
54% of the phosphorus load from the study area finds its way into the Baltic Sea. We thank Petri Ekholm 
of the Finnish Environment Institute for calculating the retention rate from the regression model.  
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Table 7.  Benefits and costs of the nutrient load reductions attributable to 
agri-environmental payments on the sample of grain farms, 
1996-2005 
Parameterizationa MNL  estimate 
P weight 1 
RPL  estimate 
P weight 1 
MNL estimate 
P weight 7.2 
 RPL  estimate 
P weight 7.2 
A.  Simulated Total    Average Total Average Total Average  Total Average
     damage    1,000 € €/ha   1,000 
€ 
€/ha   1,000 € €/ha    1,000 € €/ha 
 Prevailing policy 83,873 1,205 120,908 1,736 75,561 1,085  109,906 1,578 
 Counterfactual 94,662 1,359 136,461 1,960 85,624 1,230  124,543 1,789 
B. Effect of FAEP 
     payments 
         
 Change in total 
damage (%)b 
-11  -11  -12   -12  
 Benefit-cost ratioc 0.73  1.05  0.68   0.99  
a MNL: evaluated using the marginal damage rate derived from Kosenius’ (2010) multinomial logit 
model. 
   RPL: evaluated using the marginal damage rate derived from Kosenius’ (2010) random parameters logit 
model. 
b The difference between the counterfactual and prevailing-policy simulations divided by the 
counterfactual   simulation.   
c The total reduction in damage divided by the total cost of the FAEP payments (includes administrative 
costs and the opportunity cost of public funds).      
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8. Conclusion 
Over one hundred regional or national conservation schemes have been 
introduced in the EU since the Agri-environmental Regulation came into force in 
1992. By 2002, one quarter of the agricultural area in the EU was registered in an 
agri-environmental program. The programs are essentially voluntary regulation 
that provides incentives, but not mandates, for reducing the environmental 
damage from agriculture. In the US, in turn, the 2002 Federal Farm Bill 
contained a notable increase in funding for conservation initiatives. Critics argue 
that many of the agri-environmental programs in the EU and in the US are 
merely a trade-friendly way to ease the transition from production to non-
production payments under the World Trade Organization’s “Green Box”. As the 
debate over agricultural policy continues, it is important for policymakers to have 
reliable information on how these programs actually perform.  Are they 
successful in reducing agriculture’s environmental impact over and beyond what 
would have happened anyway?  
This study presents a structural econometric model designed to evaluate the 
consequences of payments through the Finnish Agri-Environmental Program – 
one of the most extensive AEPs in the EU – for nutrient pollution originating 
from grain production. We estimated farms’ land allocation and input decisions 
under a system of compensatory payments that are proportional to land area, 
including agri-environmental subsidies. The estimated land allocation and input 
demand functions were then used to predict the impact of the agri-environmental 
payments on grain and set-aside areas and fertilization intensity. We next 
combined the predicted land allocation and input use with environmental 
production functions to assess the impact of program payments on water 
protection.  
The econometric and simulation analyses indicate that the agri-environmental 
payments to grain farms had a fairly small effect on fertilizer use and area of land 
used for grain production over the period 1996-2005. At  the impact on 
fertilizer use is smaller than that indicated in Pufahl and Weiss (2009) for 
German AEPs (average treatment effect of 9.5%- ). By raising the profitability 
of land used to produce grain, the payments also had the counterproductive 
impact of reducing the amount of land in set-aside. Similar impacts of 
government farm payments have been reported in other research (Key, Lubowski 
and Roberts 2005; Lubowski, Plantinga and Stavins 2008). Accounting for 
specific water protection measures, vegetative filter strips and wintertime 
vegetation, the preventive impact of the payments over the period 1996-2005 was 
to reduce nitrogen loading by 11% and phosphorus loading by 13% relative to 
what would have happened without agri-environmental subsidies. Combined 
with monetary estimates for damage from nutrient pollution, the results indicate 
that the agri-environmental payments reduced the damage from grain production 
1.5%
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by 11% to 12%, with the estimated ratio of benefits produced by program 
payments to costs ranging from 0.68 to 1.05. 
Overall the agri-environmental payments have reduced nutrient pollution from 
farms. This finding is consistent with results by Chabe-Ferret and Subervie 
(2012) for the impact of French agri-environmental schemes targeted at reducing 
nitrogen loading. However, the load reductions achieved fall short of Finland’s 
water protection targets and the reductions needed to significantly improve water 
quality in the Baltic Sea. This suggests that more specifically targeted policies 
would be needed to further reduce farm-source nutrient loading, such as taxing 
fertilizers and emphasizing payments for specific water protection measures. 
Furthermore, the incentives provided by the FAEP payments for converting set-
aside into grain production should be reconsidered.  
The predictive ability of our modeling approach regarding grain and set-aside 
areas and fertilizer use is strong. Prediction of the effects of agri-environmental 
payments on nutrient loading is less reliable given that the environmental 
production functions have been calibrated for southern Finland and thus provide 
only an approximation for the study area as a whole. Our estimate of the benefits 
from the FAEP is based on reductions in farm-source nutrient pollution as the 
program’s main focus is on water protection objectives. However, the program 
also seeks to reduce the risks associated with the use of pesticides and, starting 
from the second program phase (2000-2006), to maintain biodiversity and rural 
landscapes. Possible benefits produced in terms of these additional objectives are 
not included in our benefit estimate. That estimate was also derived under the 
assumption of constant marginal damage from nutrient loading, which is a 
simplification. However, as the predicted changes in nutrient loading are not very 
large, constant marginal damage provides a reasonable approximation. 
The empirical modeling framework presented in this study could be applied to 
examine the effects of fertilizer taxes, alternative agri-environmental payment 
rates, and the relative emphases to be placed on payments provided through 
general and more specifically targeted agri-environmental schemes. We leave 
comparing the cost-effectiveness of different types of policies on agriculturally 
produced pollution as a topic for future study. In the case of nutrient loads, the 
accuracy of predictions could be improved by integrating the land allocation and 
fertilizer intensities simulated with the economic model with catchment-scale 
physical models simulating nutrient loads from different land uses and fertilizer 
intensities (e.g. INCA, Wade et al. 2002, and SWAT, Arnold and Fohrer 2005). 
 
 
 31 
 
References 
Aakkula, J., Manninen, T. and Nurro, M. (eds.) 2010. Follow-up Study on the 
Impacts of Agri-Environment Measures (MYTVAS 3) – Mid-term Report. In 
Finnish (with extended English summary).  Reports of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry 1. 
Agency for Rural Affairs (ARA) 2011. Guidebook on monitoring of the arable 
land and animal support. In Finnish.  
Arnold, J. and Fohrer, N. 2005. SWAT2000: Current capabilities and research 
opportunities in applied watershed modeling. Hydrological Processes 19(3): 
563-572.  
Baylis, K., Peplow, S., Rausser, G. and Simon, L. 2011. Agri-environmental 
programs and trade negotiations in the United States and the European Union. 
EuroChoices 10(2): 55-60. 
Baylis, K., Rausser, G. and Simon, L. 2004. Agri-environmental programs in the 
United States and the European Union. In G. Anania, M. Bohman, C.A. Carter 
and A.F. McCalla (eds.). Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where 
Are We Heading? Cheltenham, UK. Edward Elgar.  
Buller, H. 2000. Regulation 2078: patterns of implementation. In Buller, H., 
Wilson, G. and Höll (Eds.), Agri-Environmental Policy in the European 
Union. Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, England.  
Buller, H., Wilson, G. and Höll, A. 2000. Introduction: the emergence of 
regulation 2078. In Buller, H., Wilson, G. and Höll (Eds.), Agri-
Environmental Policy in the European Union. Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 
England.  
Chabé-Ferret, S. and Subervie, J. 2012. How much green for the buck? 
Estimating additional and windfall effects of the French agro-environmental 
schemes by DID-matching. Working Paper, Toulouse School of Economics. 
Darnall, N. and Sides, S. 2008. Assessing the performance of voluntary 
environmental programs: does certification matter? The Policy Studies Journal 
36(1): 95-117. 
Ekholm, P., Granlund, K., Kauppila, P., Mitikka, S., Niemi, J., Rankinen, K., 
Räike, A. and Räsänen, J. 2007. Influence of EU policy on agricultural nutrient 
losses and the state of receiving surface waters in Finland. Agricultural and 
Food Science 16: 282-300.  
European Commission 2005. Agri-environment Measures. Overview on General 
Principles, Types of Measures, and Application. Directorate General for 
Agriculture and Rural Development, Unit G-4 - Evaluation of Measures 
applied to Agriculture, Studies. Brussels: European Commission.  
 32 
 
Hanley, N. and Oglethorpe, D. 1999. Emerging policies on externalities from 
agriculture: an analysis for the European Union. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics (81)5: 1222-1227.  
Hanrahan, C., and Schnepf, R. 2007. WTO Doha Round: The Agricultural 
Negotiations (PDF). Congressional Research Service. 
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL33144.pdf (retrieved 
November 28, 2011). 
Heckman, J. 2010. Building bridges between structural and program evaluation 
approaches to evaluating policy. Journal of Economic Literature 48(2), 356-
398. 
Heckman, J. and Vytlacil, E. 2007. Econometric Evaluation of Social Programs, 
in Heckman, J. and Leamer, E. (eds), Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 6. 
Elsevier, Amsterdam.  
Helsinki Commission (Helcom) 2010. The Extended Summary of the Main 
Results of the Fifth Pollution Load Compilation (Draft May 7, 2010). 
http://www.helcom.fi/stc/files/Moscow2010/PLC_summary.pdf (retrieved 
November 28, 2011). 
Helin, J., Laukkanen, M. and Koikkalainen, K. 2006. Abatement costs for 
agricultural nitrogen and phosphorus loads: a case study of crop farming in 
south-western Finland. Agricultural and Food Science 15: 351-374.   
Keane, M. 2010. Structural vs. atheoretic approaches to econometrics. Journal of 
Econometrics 156: 3-20.  
Key, N., Lubowski, R. and Roberts, M. 2005. Farm-level production effects from 
participation in government commodity programs: Did the 1996 Federal 
Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act make a Difference? American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 87(5): 1211-1219.  
Koehler, D. 2007. The effectiveness of voluntary environmental programs - a 
policy at a crossroads? Policy Studies Journal 35(4), pp. 689-722.  
Kosenius, A.-K. 2010. Heterogeneous preferences for water quality attributes: 
the case of eutrophication in the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Sea. Ecological 
Economics 69: 528-538. 
Koundouri, P., Laukkanen, M., Myyrä, S. and Nauges, C. 2009. The Effects of 
EU Agricultural Policy Changes on Farmers’ Risk Attitudes. European Review 
of Agricultural Economics, 36(1): 53-77. 
Kuismanen, M. 2000. Labour supply and income tax changes: a simulation study 
for Finland. Bank of Finland Discussion Paper, 5/2000. 
 33 
 
Lacroix, A. and Thomas, A. 2011. Estimating the Environmental Impact of Land 
and Production Decisions with Multivariate Selection Rules and Panel Data. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 93(3): 784-802. 
Lankoski, J., Ollikainen, M. and Uusitalo, P. 2006. No-till technology: benefits to 
farmers and the environment? Theoretical Analysis and application to Finnish 
agriculture. European Review of Agricultural Economics 33(2): 193-221. 
Laukkanen, M. and Nauges, C. 2011. Environmental and production cost impacts 
of no-till in Finland: Estimates from observed behavior. Land Economics 
87(3): 508-527. 
Lepistö, A., Granlund, K., Kortelainen, P. and Räike, A. 2006. Nitrogen in river 
basins: Sources, retention in the surface waters and peatlands, and fluxes to 
estuaries in Finland. Science of the Total Environment 365: 238–259. 
Lubowski, R., Plantinga, A. and Stavins, R. 2008. What drives land-use change 
in the United States? A national analysis of landowner decisions. Land 
Economics 84(4): 529-550.  
Marggraf, R. 2003. Comparative assessment of agri-environmental programmes 
in federal states of Germany. Agriculture, ecosystems and the environment 98: 
507-516.  
Markowska, A. and Zylicz, T. 1999. Costing an international public good: the 
case of the Baltic Sea. Ecological Economics 30: 301-316.  
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestery (MAF) 2000. The Horizontal Rural 
Development Program 2000-2006. (In Finnish). 
www.mmm.fi/horisontaaliohjelma (retrieved November 28, 2011).  
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestery (MAF) 2004. Mid-term Evaluation of the 
Horizontal Rural Development Program (In Finnish, with English summary). 
MAF Publications 1/2004.  
National Audit Office of Finland (NAOF) 2008. Reducing agriculturally-
produced nutrient pollution. Audit Report 175/2008.  
Niemi, J. and Ahlstedt,J. 2005. Finnish Agriculture and Rural Industries – Ten 
Years in the European Union. Agrifood Research Finland, Economic Research 
(MTTL). Publications 105a.  
OECD 2003. The Greening of the WTO Green Box. Paris: OECD.  
Pitkänen, H., Kiirikki, M., Savchuk, O., Räike, A., Korpinen, P. and Wulff, F. 
2007. Searching efficient protection strategies for the eutrophied Gulf of 
Finland: the combined use of 1D and 3D modeling in assessing long-term state 
scenarios with high spatial resolution. Ambio 36(2-3): 272-279.  
 34 
 
Primdahl, J., Peco, B., Schramek, J., Andersen, E. and Onate, J. 2003. 
Environmental effects of agri-environmental schemes in Western Europe. 
Journal of Environmental Management 67: 129-138.  
Pufahl, A. and Weiss, C. 2009. Evaluating the effects of farm programmes: 
results from propensity score matching. European Review of Agricultural 
Economics 36 (1): 79-101.   
Puustinen, M., Merilä, E., Palko, J. and Seuna, P. 1994. Drainage Status, 
Cultivation Practices and Factors Affecting Nutrient Loading from Finnish 
Fields. Publications of the National Board of Waters and the Environment, 
Series A (198). National Board of Waters and the Environment, Finland (in 
Finnish).  
Rankinen, K., Ekholm, P, Sjöblom, H., Rita, H. and Vesikko, L. 2010. Material 
fluxes in river basins and their determinants. In Aakkula, J., Manninen, T. and 
Nurro, M. (eds.) Follow-up Study on the Impacts of Agri-Environment 
Measures (MYTVAS 3) – Mid-term Report. In Finnish (with extended English 
summary).  Reports of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 1. 
Redfield, A.C., Ketchum, B.H. and Richards, F.A. 1963. The influence of 
organisms on the composition of seawater. In: Hill MN (ed.) The Sea, vol 2. 
Wiley, New York. 
Rekolainen, S., Pitkänen, H., Bleeker, A. and Felix, S. 1995. Nitrogen and 
phosphorus fluxes from Finnish agricultural areas to the Baltic Sea. Nordic 
Hydrology 26 : 55-72.  
Saarela, I., Järvi, A., Hakkola, H. and Rinne, K. 1995. Phosphorus fertilizer 
trials, 1977-1994: effects of the rate of annual phosphorus application on soil 
fertility and yields of fields crops in long-term field experiments. (In Finnish, 
with summary in English). Agrifood Research Finland, Tiedote 16/95. 
Shonkwiler, T., and S. Yen, 1999. Two-step estimation of a censored system of 
equations. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81(4): 972-982. 
Simmelsgaard, S. 1991. Estimation of nitrogen leakage functions – nitrogen 
leakage as a function of nitrogen applications for different crops on sandy and 
clay soils. In: Rude, S. (ed.). Nitrogen fertilizers in Danish Agriculture – 
present and future application and leaching, (In Danish, with English 
summary). Copenhagen: Institute of Agricultural Economics Report 62 pp. 
135-150. 
Simmelsgaard, S. and Djurhuus, J. 1998. An empirical model for estimating 
nitrate leaching as affected by crop type and the long-term fertilizer rate. Soil 
Use and Management 14: 37-43. 
Söderqvist, T. 1996. Contingent valuation of a less eutrophicated Baltic Sea. 
Beijer Discussion Papers Series No. 88, Stockholm, Sweden. 
 35 
 
Söderqvist, T. 1998. Why give up money for the Baltic Sea? Motives for 
people’s willingness (or reluctance) to pay. Environmental and Resource 
Economics 12: 249–254. 
Tamminen, T. and Andersen, T. 2007. Seasonal phytoplankton nutrient limitation 
patterns as revealed by bioassays over Baltic Sea gradients of salinity and 
eutrophication. Marine Ecology Progress Series 340, 121-138. 
Turtola, E. and Paajanen, A. 1995. Influence of improved sub-surface drainage 
on phosphorus losses and nitrogen leaching from a heavy clay soil. 
Agricultural Water Management 28: 295-310.  
Uusi-Kämppä, J. and Yläranta, T. 1992. Reduction of sediment, phosphorus and 
nitrogen transport on vegetated buffer strips. Agricultural Science in Finland 
1: 569-575.  
Uusi-Kämppä, J. and Yläranta. T. 1996. Effect of buffer strip on controlling 
erosion and nutrient losses in Southern Finland. In G. Mulamoottil, Warner, E 
and McBean, A. (eds.). Wetlands: environmental gradients, boundaries and 
buffers. Boca Raton: CRC Press/Lewis Publishers. p. 221-235. 
Uusitalo, R and Jansson, H. 2002. Dissolved reactive phosphorus in runoff 
assessed by soil extraction with an acetate buffer. Agricultural and Food 
Science in Finland 11: 343-353. 
Vuorenmaa, J., Rekolainen, S., Lepistö, A., Kenttämies, K. and Kauppila, P. 
2002. Losses of nitrogen and phosphorus from agricultural and forest areas in 
Finland during the 1980s and 1990s. Environmental Monitoring and 
Assessment 76: 213-248. 
Wade, A., Durand, P., Beaujouan, V., Wessel, W., Raat, K., Whitehead, P., 
Butterfield, D., Rankinen, K. and Lepistö, A. 2002.  A nitrogen model for 
European catchments: INCA, new model structure and equations. Hydrology 
and Earth System Sciences 6: 559-582. 
Whitby, M. (Ed.) 1996. The European environment and CAP reform. Policies 
and prospects for conservation. CAB International, Guildford.   
Wu, J., Adams, R.M., Kling, C. and Tanaka, K. 2004. From Microlevel 
Decisions to Landscape Changes: An Assessment of Agricultural 
Conservation Policies. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86(1): 26-
41.  
 
 36 
 
Appendix 1. Description of Shonkwiler and Yen’s 
approach to control for censoring of land set-aside 
In our model, the non-conditional expectation of land set-aside for farm i at time 
t ( ,f itl ) can be written as follows: 
           , , , , , , , ,Prob 0 0 Prob 0 0 Prob 0 0 .f it f it f it f it f it f it f it f itE l l E l l l l E l l            
Let us denote by itd  the variable taking the value 1 if , 0f itl   and 0 otherwise.  
We assume the following specifications for the corresponding (unobserved) 
latent variables: 
 * * ', 3 3 3,  and f it it i it it it itl g d v     x β z α , 
with 3  and β α  vectors of unknown parameters and itx  the vector of explanatory 
variables, which includes the price of output, the prices of fertilizer and 
pesticides, the set of subsidies and total land. The vector 'itz  contains explanatory 
variables that are assumed to influence the farm’s decision to have some set-aside 
( itx  and 'itz  can have variables in common), and and it itv  are random errors 
assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution with  cov , it itv  . In 
addition, we have the following relationships: 
*
*
, ,*
1 if 0
 and 
0 if 0
it
it f it it f it
it
d
d l d l
d
     . 
The unconditional mean of ,f itl  is (Shonkwiler and Yen, 1999): 
       ' ' ', 3 3, ,f it it it it it itE l g   x z z α x β z α  
where  .  and  .  are the standard normal probability density function and 
cumulative distribution function, respectively. 
Hence, the equation for land set-aside to be estimated in the system is as follows: 
     ' ', 3 3 3 3,,f it it it it i itl g u     z α x β z α . 
The estimation procedure involves two steps. In the first step, estimates   of α α  
are obtained from the estimation of a random-effect Probit model using the 
binary decision to set aside land ( 1, 0itd  ). We use as independent variables the 
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proportion of land planted with grain in the previous period; the prices of 
fertilizer, pesticides and labor; the per-hectare area-based subsidies, including 
CAP arable-area and less-favored-area and basic environmental subsidies); the 
per-hectare subsidy for set-aside; the price of grass; and dummies for support 
regions. The estimates   of α α  are then used to calculate  'it z α  and  'it z α . In 
the second stage, the system is estimated with the following equation for set-
aside: 
     ' ', 3 3 3 3,,f it it it it i itl g u     z α x β z α . 
Estimation results of the first-stage random-effect Probit model are not shown 
here but are available upon request. 
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Appendix 2. Summary statistics for the sample and the 
population of Finnish grain farms 
Table A2.1. Average farm size (ha) by year and agricultural support region, 
sample  
Support 
region 
 
Year 
A B C1 C2 
    
1996 52 39 37 32 
1997 56 37 37 32 
1998 61 36 35 30 
1999 62 42 41 35 
2000 64 42 33 37 
2001 61 45 38 32 
2002 62 45 41 43 
2003 64 45 45 43 
2004 63 46 44 49 
2005 62 53 47 46 
 
Table A2.2.  Average farm size (ha) by year and agricultural support region, 
all Finnish grain farms (source: Finnish farm registry) 
Support 
region 
 
Year 
A B C1 C2 
    
1996 33 24 18 18 
1997 34 25 19 19 
1998 35 26 20 19 
1999a - - - - 
2000 37 27 21 21 
2001 39 28 22 22 
2002 39 29 23 23 
2003 40 30 24 24 
2004 41 30 24 25 
2005 43 31 25 26 
            a Farm registry data were not collected in 1999. 
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Table A2.3.  Proportion of farms located in each agricultural support region 
by year and over the entire study period, sample  
Support 
region 
 
Year 
A B C1 C2 
    
1996 27 % 53 % 11 % 8 % 
1997 29 % 53 % 10 % 8 % 
1998 27 % 47 % 16 % 10 % 
1999 30 % 48 % 14 % 8 % 
2000 29 % 51 % 11 % 9 % 
2001 28 % 49 % 10 % 13 % 
2002 31 % 46 % 11 % 12 % 
2003 29 % 45 % 14 % 13 % 
2004 31 % 43 % 16 % 11 % 
2005 34 % 38 % 14 % 13 % 
Total 29 % 47 % 13 % 11 % 
Table A2.4.  Proportion of farms located in each agricultural support region 
by year and over the entire study period, all Finnish grain farms 
(source: Finnish farm registry) 
Support 
region 
 
Year 
A B C1 C2 
    
1996 24 % 39 % 24 % 13 % 
1997 23 % 39 % 24 % 14 % 
1998 23 % 38 % 24 % 15 % 
1999 a - - - - 
2000 22 % 38 % 24 % 16 % 
2001 21 % 38 % 25 % 16 % 
2002 21 % 38 % 25 % 17 % 
2003 20 % 38 % 25 % 17 % 
2004 20 % 37 % 25 % 18 % 
2005 20 % 37 % 25 % 18 % 
Total 22 % 38 % 24 % 16 % 
            a Farm registry data were not collected in 1999.  
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Table A2.5.  Fertilizer purchases in proportion to cultivated area (kg/ha), 
sample 
Year Nitrogen Phosphorus 
1996 119 18 
1997 126 19 
1998 121 18 
1999 124 19 
2000 119 18 
2001 106 16 
2002 105 16 
2003 103 16 
2004 104 16 
2005 102 15 
Approximation based on recorded fertilizer expenditure and the assumption that farms 
used the compound fertilizer typically used in grain production, which has a 20% 
nitrogen and 3% phosphorus content. 
 
Table A2.6.  Fertilizer purchases in proportion to cultivated area (kg/ha), all 
of Finland 
Year Nitrogen Phosphorus 
1996 92 16 
1997 86 12 
1998 85 11 
1999 81 11 
2000 84 10 
2001 83 11 
2002 81 10 
2003 80 10 
2004 76 9 
2005 75 9 
Source: Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (TIKE). The 
kg/ha estimate has been calculated as the ratio of fertilizer sales in Finland at large and 
the total cultivated area. 
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Appendix 3. Price statistics 
Table A3.  Mean grain price, mean labor price, and fertilizer and pesticide 
price indices (base 100 in 2005) 
Year Grain price  Labor price 
 
Fertilizer 
price index
Pesticide 
 price index 
 (EUR 2005/t) (EUR 2005/hour) (base 100 in 2005) 
1996 150.4 8.7 93.9 126.8 
1997 138.3 8.7 92.4 121.3 
1998 124.2 8.8 89.6 118.6 
1999 115.4 8.8 87.3 115.9 
2000 114.3 8.7 88.9 113.6 
2001 111.3 9.1 96.3 109.5 
2002 106.6 9.3 94.3 107.3 
2003 101.0 10.0 93.5 102.3 
2004 89.0 10.3 96.0 102.7 
2005 80.6 11.0 100.0 100.0 
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Appendix 4. Estimation results (four equations out  
of six) 
Table A4.  Within-SURE estimation results (main equations of interest), 
1,564 observations 
 
Estimated 
coefficient
Bootstrapped 
standard errors 
p-value
Land allocated to grains 
Fertilizer price  -0.784 0.263 0.003
Price of pesticides -0.900 0.133 0.000
Price of grain 0.820 0.061 0.000
Land-area based subsidies to grains 0.087 0.014 0.000
Set-aside subsidies -0.087 0.014 0.000
FAEP special subsidies 0.002 0.001 0.037
Total farm area 0.882 0.014 0.000
Land set-aside 
Fertilizer price  0.784 0.263 0.003
Price of pesticides 0.900 0.133 0.000
Price of grain -0.820 0.061 0.000
Land-area based subsidies to grains -0.087 0.014 0.000
Set-aside subsidies 0.087 0.014 0.000
FAEP special subsidies -0.002 0.001 0.037
Total farm area 0.118 0.014 0.000
Additional terma 5.436 3.831 0.156
Use of fertilizer 
Fertilizer price  -401.032 46.269 0.000
Price of pesticides 279.185 32.096 0.000
Price of grain -10.961 1.278 0.000
Land-area based subsidies to grains 0.784 0.263 0.003
Set-aside subsidies -0.784 0.263 0.003
FAEP special subsidies -1.496 0.784 0.056
Total farm area 6.852 2.385 0.004
Use of pesticides 
Fertilizer price  279.185 32.096 0.000
Price of pesticides -229.437 25.389 0.000
Price of grain 4.414 0.769 0.000
Land-area based subsidies to grains 0.900 0.133 0.000
Set-aside subsidies -0.900 0.133 0.000
FAEP special subsidies 0.702 0.291 0.016
Total farm area -2.270 1.827 0.214
a Additional term to control for selection bias (see Appendix 1). 
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